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ABSTRACT
Using the February 2016 federal district court ruling in Fields v. City ifPhiladelphia as an
analytical springboard, this Article examines growing judicial recognition of a qualified
First Amendment right to record images of police working in public places. The Article
argues that Judge Mark Kearney erred in Fields by requiring that citizens must intend to
challenge or criticize police, via either spoken words or expressive conduct, in order for
the act of recording to constitute "speech" under the First Amendment. It asserts that
a mere intent to observe police-not to challenge or criticize them-suffices. It then
also explores how recording falls within the scope of what some scholars call "speech
facilitating conduct." Additionally, the Article criticizes the district court's view in Fields,
as well as that of the Southern District ofN ew York in 2015, suggesting that the right to
record is possessed only by journalists, not by all citizens.

AUTHOR
Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville,
Fla. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991,
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication,
Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The author thanks Amy Barrett
and Olivia Vega for their excellent work on early drafts of this Article.

64 UCLA L. REv. Disc. 230 (2016)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... .232

I.

CUTTING AGAINST THE GROWING GRAIN OF AUTHORITY:
RETICENCE IN FIELDS AND THE THIRD CIRCUIT TO RECOGNIZE A
FIRST A MENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD .......................................................... .236

II.

SPEECH-FACILITATING CONDUCT: PROTECTING THE PROCESS OF
MAKING EXPRESSION, NoT JusT THE FINAL PRODUCT .................................. .241

IV.

III.

VIEWPOINT-BASED Focus ON SPEECH AND INTENT IN FIELDS:
ANOTHER STRIKE AGAINST THE RULING ........................................................ .244
WHOSE RIGHT IS

IT ANYWAY? DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN

CITIZENS AND THE PRESS .................................................................................249
CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................252

231

232

64 UCLA L.

REV. DISC.

230 (2016)

INTRODUCTION

if

In February 2016, a federal district court in Fields v. City Philadelphia1
held there is no First Amendment' right to record images of police performing
duties in public places, "absent any criticism or challenge to police conduct."3 Spe
cifically, U.S. District Judge Mark Kearney found "no basis to craft a new First
Amendment right based solely on 'observing and recording' without expressive
conduct,"4 and he concluded that "photographing police is not, as a matter of law,
expressive activity."5
The court reasoned that the two plaintiffs in Fields lost under this standard
because they "essentially concede[ d] they spoke no words or conduct expressing
criticism of the police before or during their image capture."6 The court ex
plained that the intent of Richard Fields, a Temple University student, in using
"his cell phone to photograph approximately twenty police officers standing
outside a home hosting a party,"7 was merely to take "a picture of an 'interesting'
and 'cool' scene."8 Similarly, the intent of plaintiff Amanda Geraci, who vide
otaped "a public protest against hydraulic fracturing,"9 was simply to serve as a
"legal observer''10 and "to observe only."11
Thus, because the intent of Fields and Geraci was neither to challenge
nor to criticize the police actions they recorded, and because both silently

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19,
2016).
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.CONST.amend.I. The
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-one years ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v.New York, 268 U.S.652, 666 (1925).
Fields, 2016 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 20840, at *2 (emphasis added).
Id. at*3.
Id.at*19.
Id. at*12.
Id.at*4.
Id. at*22.
Id. at*6.
Id. at*6.
Id. at*22.
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filmed rather than spoke up,12 their First Amendment speech claims failed. This
result is, perhaps, more disturbing for Geraci, who claims an officer physically
stopped her from recording as she moved closer to film police arresting a pro
testor.13
In the court's view, however, the silent conduct ofrecording only equates to
speech under the First Amendment ifit constitutes symbolic expression, such as,
he wrote, "picketing, armband-wearing, flag-waving and flag-burning."14 The
test for symbolic expression, fashioned four-plus decades ago by the U.S. Su
preme Court in Spence v. Washington,15 requires both "an intent to convey a par
ticularized message" and a great likelihood "that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."16
In a nutshell, because neither Fields nor Geraci intended to convey a partic
ular message when they recorded images, as required under the first prong of
Spence, they did not engage in expressive conduct. At a more granular level, the
twin acts ofpushing a record button on a smartphone and holding the device aleft to
capture images ofpolice are, in Judge Kearney's estimation, merely conduct, not
speech. He reasoned, in applying Spence, that: 17
Fields and Geraci cannot meet the burden of demonstrating their tak
ing, or attempting to take, pictures with no further comments or con
duct is "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" to be
deemed expressive conduct. Neither Fields nor Geraci direct us to
facts showing at the time they took or wanted to take pictures, they
asserted anything to anyone. There is also no evidence any of the of
ficers understood them as communicating any idea or message. 18

On March 14, 2016, Judge Kearney affirmed his prior ruling on Amanda
Geraci's First Amendment claim in Fields, making it final.19 The judge reiterated
in his March decision that "[ w]e have not seen, and counsel has not shown us,

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See generally Fields, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *6 (providing specifically that the officer
"'attacked her' by physically restraining her against a pillar and preventing her from videotaping the
arrest'').
Id. at *10.
418 U.S. 405 (1974).
Id. at 410-411.
Judge Kearney wrote that "[e]xpressive conduct exists where 'an intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it."' Fields, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *10 (quoting Heffernan v. City of
Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2015)).
Fields, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at*ll.
Geraci v. City ofPhiladelphia, No. 14-5264, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32146, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
14, 2016).
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any court extending the First Amendment rights to speech to include silent obser
vation without expressing any challenge to the police."20 When it comes to
achieving First Amendment status for recording images of police, then, silence is
anything but golden in the Keystone State.
This Article critiques the February 2016 opinion in Fields v. City Phila
delphia. It argues the ruling is problematic for at least four reasons. First, as Part I
illustrates, Fields is out of step with a growing body of cases from outside the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the circuit in which Judge Kearney sits)
that recognizes a qualified First Amendment right to record images of police do
ing their jobs in public venues, regardless of the intent of the recorder.21
Second, Part II argues22 that Fields ignores the fact that pushing a record
button on a smartphone to capture video amounts to what Wesley Campbell, ex
ecutive director of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, recently called
"speech-facilitating conduct."23 By way of a timely analogy, just as the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in December 2015 recognized that the process
of tattooing-not simply the final product of the tattoo-merits First Amend
ment protection,24 so too is the process of recording, videotaping, or photo
graphing images-not merely the ultimate images-protected speech.
Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded in
2012 that "[t]he act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily in
cluded within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a
corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording."25 This comports
with Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat's more general observation in 2015 that "in
formation gathering is necessary to produce speech,"26 given that the act of video
recording is tantamount to gathering information in the form of visual images.
Part III then analyzes the court's focus in Fields on a person's expressed in
tent or purpose when recording as providing the critical key for deciding if the act
of recording may enter through the otherwise locked door of First Amendment
protection as speech. 27 In the process, Part III asserts that the court's rule in
Fields embodies unconstitutional viewpoint-based censorship.

if

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part IL
Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1,4 (2016).

Buehrlev. City of Key West,813 F.3d 973,976 (11th Cir. 2015).
ACLU oflll.v. Alvarez,679 F.3d 583,595 (7th Cir 2012).
Ashutosh Bhagwat,Producing Speech, 56 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1029,1052 (2015).
See iiyra Part III.

Recording Images of Police

235

Next, Part IV criticizes another facet of the Fields opinion.28 Specifically, in
the course of dismissing the plaintiffs' First Amendment argument, the judge in
Fields remarked that the plaintiffs "are not members of the press."29 This fact of
non-press status, the Article argues, should be irrelevant regarding whether re
cording police is protected expression. Yet, it is a point Judge Kearney reiterated
in his March 2016 decision, writing that"[w]e do not view our role as expressing
an opinion on the First Amendment in any other context involving other inter
ests, such as the press or seeking to petition the government. We review only
whether these facts constitute the required expressive conduct equal to a citizen's
'speech."'30 This suggests, even more clearly, that Judge Kearney distinguishes be
tween citizens' freedom of speech under the Speech Clause of the First Amend
ment and journalists' freedom under the Press Clause. In other words, for Judge
Kearney, a member of the press might be protected while silently recording po
lice, but a citizen such as Amanda Geraci is not.
If the right to record exists, however, then it surely is a citizen's right, not
merely a journalist's right. Specifically, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Glik v. Cunnijfe3 1 opined in 2011:
[C]hanges in technology and society have made the lines between
private citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw. The pro
liferation of electronic devices with video-recording capability means
that many of our images of current events come from bystanders with
a ready cell phone or digital camera rather than a traditional film
crew, and news stories are now just as likely to be broken by a blogger
at her computer as a reporter at a major newspaper.32
Finally, the Article concludes by calling on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit to reverse Fields,33 which the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) is, in fact, appealing.34 This is particularly important because, as the Ar
ticle points out in Part I, the Third Circuit today fails to recognize a qualified
First Amendment right to film police in public places.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Part IV.
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2016).
Geraci v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-5264, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32146, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 14, 2016) (emphasis added).
655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id. at 84.
See infra Conclusion.
See generally Fields v. City rf Philadelphia, ACLU OF PA., http://www.aclupa.org/our
work/legal/legaldocket/fields-v-city-philadelphia [https://perma.cc/E8HG-RMJTJ (noting that
"[t]he ACLU has appealed this ruling to the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Third Circuit").
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CUITINGAGAINSTTHEGROWINGGRAIN OFAUTHOR ITY:
RETICENCE IN FIELDS AND T HE THIRD CIRCUIT TO RECOGNIZE A
FIRSTAMENDMENT RIG HT TO RECORD

A 2015 law journal article asserts that "videotaping the police has become a
cultural phenomenon with the aid of advances in technology."35 Yet, the U.S.
Supreme Court never has squarely addressed if there is a First Amendment right
to record images of police performing their jobs in public.36
That is both unfortunate and problematic. Every week, according to Mick
ey Osterreicher, general counsel of the National Press Photographers Associa
tion, multiple incidents occur "in which police either harass, interfere or arrest
citizens-not journalists-for shooting video."37 For example, a U.S.Marshal in
April 2015 grabbed and smashed the smartphone of non-journalist Beatriz Paez
in South Gate, California, as she peacefully filmed several law enforcement offi
cials working on a public sidewalk in a residential neighborhood.38
Several federal appellate circuits, however, "have held that private citizens
have a First Amendment right to record law enforcement activities."39 Indeed, as
Professor Marc Jonathan Blitz and his colleagues pointed out in 2015 in the Wil
liam & Mary Law Review, "in a series of recent cases on video recording of police
encounters, federal courts have increasingly recognized such a right."40 One fed
eral district court in August 2015 concluded, in fact, that "most courts of appeal
... have acknowledged that the First Amendment broadly protects the right to

35.

Alexander Shaaban, Officer! You Are on Candid Camera: Why the Government Should Grant Private

36.

Citizens an Exemption From State Wiretap Laws When Surreptitiously Recording On-Duty Officers in
Public, 42 W. ST. U. L. REV. 201,204 (2015).
See Garcia v. Montgomery Cnty., No. TDC-12-3592,2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151059,at *23 (D.

37.
38.

39.
40.

Md. Nov. 5, 2015) (noting that the plaintiff"asserts that the officers violated his First Amendment
right to video record police officers in the routine public performance of their duties. The United
States Supreme Court has not yet spoken on whether this is a right protected by the First
Amendment.").
Frank Ehman, Citizens Taking Video ofPolice See Themselves Facing Arrest, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIBUNE (Aug. 29, 2015, 8:48 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/
aug/29/citizens-taking-video-of-police-see-themselves/ [https://perma.cc/CVE8-4DHS].
Steve Almasy, Marshal Caught on Cell Phone Video Smashing a Woman's Cell Phone, CNN (Apr. 22,
2015, 10:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/22/us/california-marshal-smashed-phone
[https://perma.cc/F4R7-ZF62]; Joseph Serna, With Smartphones Everywhere, Police on Notice They
May Be Caught on Camera, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-feds-probe-video-phone-in-south-gate-20150421-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6MAM-2WUP].
Robert H. Gruber, CommercialDrones and Privacy: Can We Trust States With "Drone Federalism"?,
21 RICH.J.L.&TECH. 1, 131 (2015).
Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 49, 85-86 (2015).
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make audio or visual recordings of police activity."41 This Part briefly reviews
some of these cases, providing context for better understanding the February
2016 Fields opinion at the heart of this Article. A more comprehensive, in-depth
analysis of the other cases is available elsewhere.42
At the federal appellate court level, the U.S. Court of Appeals recognized a
qualified First Amendment right to record police in public places in 2011 in Glik
v. Cunnijft.43 The right is qualified-not absolute-because it "may be subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."44 The recording in Glik oc
curred in Boston Common, where three police officers were arresting a man.45
The First Circuit declined to specify what might constitute a reasonable re
striction in this situation.46
Three years later, the First Circuit extended the right to record police
beyond park settings like Boston Common to roadside traffic stops in Gericke
v. Begin. 47 Although holding that "a traffic stop does not extinguish an indi
vidual's right to film," the First Circuit noted the qualified nature of this
right, pointing out that "[r]easonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them." 48 It suggested
that safety concerns, such as when the individual pulled over is armed, might
justify restricting the right to record.49 Finally, the appellate court drew a clear
line between recording and interfering, opining that a "police order that is specifi
cally directed at the First Amendment right to film police performing their du ties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can
reasonably conclude that the filming itself is inteifering, or is about to inteifere,
with his duties."50

41. Order on Pending Motions, Hudkins v. City oflndianapolis, 2015 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 103039, at
*45 ( S.D.Ind.Aug.6, 2015).
42. See generally Clay Calvert, The First Amendment Right to Record Images ofPolice in Public Places: The
Unreasonable Slipperiness of Reasonableness & Possible Paths Forward, 3 TEX.A&M L.REV. 1 3 1
( 2015)(providing a review ofthe case law in this area through May 2015).
43. 655 F.3d 78 ( 1st Cir.201 1).
44. Id. at 84.
45. Id. at 79-80.
46. See id. at 84 ("[T]he right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions....We have no occasion to explore those limitations here,
however."(citation omitted)).
47. 753F.3dl,7( 1stCir.2014).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
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Other federal appellate circuits recognizing a qualified right to film police in
public venues include the Seventh,51 Ninth,52 and Eleventh Circuits.53 Signifi
cantly, and as noted above,54 the Seventh Circuit ruling in ACLU Illinois v. Al
recording-not just the end product of that
varez55 is clear that the act
recording-falls within the ambit of First Amendment protection.56 And, unlike
Fields, none of the abovementioned cases or circuits require the act of recording
to be done with the intent to challenge or to criticize police conduct or to be ac
companied by spoken words in order to constitute speech.
Most recently, a federal district court in Maryland, which falls within the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,57 concluded in November 2015
"that video recording of police activity, if done peacefully and without interfering
with the performance of police duties, is protected by the First Amendment."58
The decision is particularly important because it provides a legal beachhead for
the Fourth Circuit to recognize such a right-something that, as U.S. District
Judge Theodore Chuang observed in Garcia v. Mongomery County, it "has not
addressed in a published opinion."59

if

51.

52.

53.

54.
55.
56.

57.

58.
59.

if

See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that an Illinois
"eavesdropping statute restricts a medium of expression-the use of a common instrument of
communication-and thus an integral step in the speech process. As applied here, it interferes
with the gathering and dissemination of information about government officials performing their
duties in public.").
See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing a "First Amendment
right to film matters of public interest" in the context of a man who "was videotaping people on the
streets of Seattle," including police, during a public protest march).
See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing "a First
Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions, to photograph or
videotape police conduct").
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
679 F.3d. 583.
See id at 595 (opining that "[t]he act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily
included within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the
right to disseminate the resulting recording," and adding that"[t]he right to publish or broadcast an
audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of
making the recording is wholly unprotected").
See About the Court, U.S. CT. OFAPPEALSFOR THEFOURTHCIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/
about-the-court [https://perma.cc/HWY4-2H9F] (noting that the Fourth Circuit "hears appeals
from the nine federal district courts in Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina").
Garcia v. Montgomery Cty., No. TDC-12-3592, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151059, at*27 (D. Md.
Nov. 5, 2015).
Id at*25.
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Also in 2015, a federal court in the Western District ofTexas60 and one in
the Southern District of New York61 found that there is a qualified First
Amendment right to film police doing their jobs in public venues. Unfortunate
ly, the decision by U.S. District Judge P. Kevin Castel of the Southern District of
New York suggests-in accord with Judge Kearney's February 2016 observation
in Fields that the plaintiffs in that case were not members of the press62-that this
right is held only by "a journalist who is otherwise unconnected to the events rec
orded."63 This facet of Judge Castel's opinion is critiqued in greater detail later in
PartIV.64
Against this growing spate of judicial authority, however, stands the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit-the circuit within which the district
court in Fields v. City Philadelphia sits. In 2015, Judge William Yohn Jr. of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania-the same district in which Fields is being liti
gated-observed, somewhat apologetically, that:

if

Whether the Third Circuit will eventually decide to follow what ap
pears to be a growing trend in other circuits to recognize a First
Amendment right to observe and record police activity is, of course,
not for this court to decide, even ifthere are good policy reasons I adopt
that change.65

The emphasized portion of this quotation implies that while Judge Yohn
believed there were solid justifications for recognizing a right to record, he felt
somewhat hamstrung by Third Circuit precedent from doing so. Specifically, the
Third Circuit in 2010 in Kelly v. Borough efCarlisle66 concluded that "the right to
videotape police officers during traffic stops was not clearly established"67 in May
2007 when the incident at the heart of Kelly occurred.68 It explained "there was
insufficient case law establishing a right to videotape police officers during a traf
fic stop to put a reasonably competent officer on 'fair notice' that seizing a camera
60.
61.

62.
63.

64.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See Buehler v. City of Austin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at *25 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015)
(holding that the "the right to photograph and videotape police officers as they perform their
official duties was clearly established" in 2012 when the three incidents in question took place).
Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding "that the
right to record police activity in public, at least in the case of a journalist who is otherwise
unconnected to the events recorded, was in fact 'clearly established' at the time of the events alleged
in the complaint" on November 15, 2011).
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Higginbotham, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 380.
See infra Part IV.

Montgomery v. Killingsworth, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7152, at *41 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Jan.21, 2015)
(emphasis added).
622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 263.
See id. at 251 (noting that the recording occurred on May 24, 2007).

240
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or arresting an individual for videotaping police during the stop would violate the
First Amendment."69 Because the right to record was not clearly established in
May 2007, the defendant police officer escaped monetary liability70 under the
doctrine of qualified immunity.71
Throwing a small judicial bone to the First Amendment right to record,
however, the Third Circuit in Kelly noted that "even insofar as it is clearly estab
lished, the right to record matters of public concern is not absolute; it is subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."72 Additionally, the appellate
court specified that while it previously had "not addressed directly the right to
videotape police officers,"73 it had, in a 2005 case called Gilles v. Davis,74 "hypoth
esized that 'videotaping or photographing the police in the performance of their
duties on public property may be a protected activity."'75
Thus, when Judge Kearney surveyed the legal landscape of the Third Cir
cuit in his February 2016 ruling in Fields, he found that "[w]hile acknowledging
activities observing and recording the police may be protected, our Court of Ap
peals has never held speech unaccompanied by an expressive component is always
afforded First Amendment protection."76 He therefore reasoned that the only
way in which image recordation constitutes speech within the confines of the
First Amendment is if the act of recording is "'expressive' or otherwise 'critical' of
the government."77
In summary, the Third Circuit and, within it, the Eastern District of Penn
sylvania (the venue for Fields), find themselves lagging behind other federal
courts in endorsing a qualified First Amendment right to film police doing their
jobs in public places. The next Part of this Article illustrates that the district
court's effort in Fields to separate the conduct of speech creation (the act of

69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 262.
See id. at 263 (concluding that "Officer [David] Rogers was entitled to qualified immunity on

[Brian] Kelly's First Amendment claim").
See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (observing that "[q]ualified immunity shields
federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at
the time of the challenged conduct"); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (observing
that "[q]ualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right").
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262.
Id. at 260.
427 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005).
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260 (emphasis added) (quoting Gilles v. Davis,427 F.3d 197,212 n.14 (3d Cir.
2005)).
Fields v. City of Philadelphia,No. 14-4424,2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19,2016).
Id. at *13.
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recording) from the end product of the process (the videos and images) is ex
tremely problematic.
II.

SPEECH-FACILITATING CONDUCT: PROTECTING THE PROCESS OF
MAKING EXPRESSION, NOT JUST THE FINAL PRODUCT

There is a fundamental dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence be
tween speech and conduct.78 Yet, conduct is necessary to produce speech. Pro
fessor Wesley Campbell notes that "the Supreme Court has recognized some
First Amendment protection for the speech process, and not merely the expres
sive end product."79 Campbell cites the Court's observation in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission80 that "[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech
may operate at different points in the speech process."81 The initial point in the
"speech process," is the act of creating the speech itsel£ The macro-level issue
thus becomes, as Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat wrote in 2015, "whether, and if so
to what extent, the First Amendment protects the antecedent act of producing
speech, not just the eventual communication."82
An area in which courts increasingly recognize that the antecedent process
of speech creation merits First Amendment protection equal to that of the speech
product is the conduct of creating a tattoo. A trio of cases over the past six years
illustrates this trend. Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in December 2015 held that "tattooing is artistic expression protected by
the First Amendment."83 In reaching this result, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that:
Protected artistic expression frequently encompasses a sequence of
acts by different parties, often in relation to the same piece of work.
The First Amendment protects the artist who paints a piece just as
surely as it protects the gallery owner who displays it, the buyer who
purchases it, and the people who view it.84

78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Randall P. Bezanson,Is There Such a Thing as Too Much Free Speech?, 91 OR. L. REV. 601,601
(2012) (emphasizing that the First Amendment guarantee of free speech traditionally "has rested
on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus conduct and liberty versus utility''); Martin H.
Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic Skepticism and the Theory of Free
Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 700 (2015) (addressing "the fundamental distinction between
speech and conduct").
Campbell,supra note 23,at 4.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 336.
Bhagwat, supra note 26, at 1034.
Buehrlev. City of Key West,813 F.3d 973,978 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 977.
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The Eleventh Circuit added that"[a] regulation limiting the creation of art cur
tails expression as effectively as a regulation limiting its display. The government
need not ban a protected activity such as the exhibition ofart ifit can simply pro
ceed upstream and dam the source."85
The Supreme Court ofArizona reached a similar conclusion, predicated on
comparable reasoning, in 2012 in Coleman v. City ifMesa. 86 In holding that "the
process of tattooing is expressive activity"87 and that"the process of tattooing is
protected speech,"88 Arizona's high court reasoned that"the art ofwriting is no
less protected than the book it produces; nor is painting less an act offree speech
than the painting that results."89
Both the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Buerhle v. City ifKey West and the
Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in Coleman v. City ifMesa build on the foun
dation laid by the Ninth Circuit in 2010 in Anderson v. City ifHermosa Beach. 90
The Ninth Circuit in Anderson reasoned that:
Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever drawn a distinction
between the process of creating a form of pure speech (such as writ
ing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or the
artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afforded. Alt
hough writing and painting can be reduced to their constituent acts,
and thus described as conduct, we have not attempted to disconnect
the end product from the act of creation.91

The Ninth Circuit thus held that"[t]he tattoo itse!f, the process of tattooing, and
even the business of tattooing are not expressive conduct but purely expressive ac
tivity fully protected by the First Amendment."92
Of particular importance above is the conclusion that tattooing is pure
speech, not merely expressive conduct. This finding obviates the need to apply
the two-part symbolic speech analysis under Spence to determine if conduct rises
to the level of speech for purposes of the First Amendment.93 This logic in An
derson, of course, stands in opposition to the district court's observation in Fields
that the process of recording a video of police in public places "is only afforded

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
284 P.3d 863 (Ariz. 2012).
Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 870.
621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1061-62.
Id. at 1060.
See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing the Spence test).
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First Amendment protection if we construe it as expressive conduct."94 This re
quirement-that the plaintiffs in Fields first needed to meet the test for expressive
conduct-thwarted their First Amendment argument under Spence. The first
part of the test for expressive conduct under Spence requires an "intent to convey a
specific message."95 Here, the plaintiffs stated they intended to record to merely
observe and to take images of an interesting, cool scene96-not to convey a specif
ic message. Thus, the plaintiffs in Fields did not even satisfy the first prong of
Spence because they had no intent to convey a message (an image), merely to cap
ture one.
They should never have been required to satisfy the Spence test, however,
because legally separating the unprotected act of pushing record from the speech
product it immediately creates is disingenuous. The act of recording speech
visual images, in Fields-is a necessary condition for the pure speech product
(photos or videos) to exist in the first place. Furthermore, not only is the conduct
of pushing the record button a necessary condition for producing the speech prod
uct, but it also is the immediate antecedent act that triggers speech production. In
other words, no intervening conduct by a human between pushing record and
capturing the image is needed to produce the image. Finally, in addition to the
close physical proximity between human conduct and image creation, the temporal
proximity between pushing record and the resultant image being captured is near
ly instantaneous on a smartphone. All of these facts suggest it is somewhat disin
genuous to erect a legal barrier separating the unprotected act of pushing record
from the speech product it immediately creates.
There is yet another reason why imposing the expressive-conduct require
ment of an intent "to communicate a particularized message"97 upon the act of re
cording, as in Fields's reasoning, is misguided. In 2011, University of
Pennsylvania Professor Seth Kreimer argued that "in the emerging environ
ment of pervasive image capture, the difference between capturing images and
disseminating images erodes rapidly."98 Illustrating how the mere recordation
of information constitutes speech, regardless of an intent to transmit that

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2016) (emphasis added).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1118 (5th ed.
2015).
See supra notes 7 1-1 and accompanying text.
Diahann DaSilva, Playing a "Labeling Game": Classifying Expression as Conduct as a Means of
Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. REV. 767,774 (2015).
Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the
Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335,376 (2011).
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information-such as, to convey a particularized message with it, per Spenc�to
an audience, Kreimer writes that:
We would recognize police seizure of, or prosecution for, drafts oflet
ters or manuscripts as an interference with freedom of expression,
even if the seizure occurred before the writer had decided to send or
publish them, though no designated "audience" had been deprived of
their content. So, too, image capture before the decision to transmit
images falls within the scope of the emerging medium.99

Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment's
words "speech" and "press" are not narrowly cabined by some literal meaning, but
instead encompass certain penumbral rights. As the Court wrote in Griswold v.
Connecticui1 °0 more than a half-century ago,"[t]he right of freedom of speech and
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the
right to receive, [and] the right to read."101 Critically, the Court in Griswoldadd
ed that "[w]ithout those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less se
cure."102 Today, the right to record images might be considered another
peripheral right. Indeed, without the peripheral First Amendment right to rec
ord images today, the ability for the images to even exist would be nonexistent,
not simply less secure.

III.

VIEWPOINT-BASED Focus ON SPEECH AND INTENT IN FIELDS:
ANOTHER STRIKE AGAINST THE RULING

In Fields, plaintiffs Richard Fields and Amanda Geraci broadly asserted that
"the mere act of observing and recording is entitled to First Amendment protec
tion."103 Yet, when it came to framing the key issue before the court, the district
court wrote-much more narrowly-that it was whether citizens "enjoy a First
Amendment right to photograph police absent any criticism or challenge to police
conduct."104
In addressing the issue of whether there is a First Amendment right to pho
tograph police absent any criticism or challenge to police conduct, the district

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 377.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 482-83.
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *9 n.27 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 19, 2016).
104. Id. at *2. Judge Kearney added that he was "not addressing a First Amendment right to photograph
or film police when citizens challenge police conduct." Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
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court emphasized that neither Richard Fields nor Amanda Geraci "uttered any
words to the effect he or she sought to take pictures to oppose police activity."105
Furthermore, he wrote that "[n]either Fields nor Geraci assert they engaged in
conduct 'critical' of the government; both assert they were only 'observing' police
activity."106 The court emphasizes that criticism of police-found either in the
expressive conduct of the recorder or in the words spoken by the recorder-is es
sential. It added that "Fields and Geraci essentially concede they spoke no words
or conduct expressing criticism of the police before or during their image cap
ture."107 Judge Kearney even dropped a footnote to point out that "[n]either
Fields nor Geraci allege or offer evidence their conduct expressed criticism of po
lice activity."108 And, ultimately, Judge Kearney concluded that "photographing
police without any challenge or criticism"109 does not constitute speech protected by
the First Amendment.
This analysis, with its uncompromising requirement that recording must be
accompanied by spoken words critical of the police or be done with an intent to
criticize the police, is troubling for two key reasons. First, it suggests that citizens
may be protected by the First Amendment when they record images of police,
but only if they first announce, either through their words or their expressive ac
tions, to the very same officers they are recording, that they are doing so to criti
cize or challenge the officers' actions. This, of course, is not likely to go over well
with the officers, who might very well order the recording stopped, seize the
phone or camera, or otherwise obstruct the recording.
Notably, plaintiff Richard Fields had his iPhone seized and thrown to the
concrete-cracking its screen, in the process-by a Philadelphia police officer,
and all Fields merely said to the officer was that he was standing on public prop
erty, not interfering with any police investigation, and would not leave.110 One
wonders what might have happened had he said something critical of the officer.
As Carlos Miller, the founder and publisher of Photography is Not a Crime,
bluntly put it, Judge Kearney held that "citizens do not have the First Amend
ment right to record police in public. That is, unless those citizens are telling the
cops to go fuck themselves. Then it's protected speech."111 Similarly, under the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at*9 (emphasis added).
Id. at*22 (emphasis added).
Id. at*12 (emphasis added).
Id. at*9 n.27 (emphasis added).
Id. at*2 (emphasis added).
Complaint at 3 4, Fieldsv. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2016).
Carlos Miller, Rookie Federal fudge in Pennsylvania Rules Citizens Do Not Have First Amendment
Right to Record Police, PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT A CRIME (Feb. 22, 2016),
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district court's requirement in Fields that speech or conduct critical of police must
accompany the act of recording, Pennsylvania attorney Jordan Rushie contends,
"If you want to film the police, also make sure to maybe yell at them too."112
The bottom line is that imposing a requirement that citizens either must
explicitly tell police they are recording them for purposes of criticism or that cit
izens must somehow convey this same message through "expressive conduct"
creates a profound chilling effect on the right to record. Few citizens would risk
possible physical abuse at the hands a police officer by telling him, "I think what
you are doing is wrong, so I'm going to record it." In other words, Judge Kearney
adopted a test for speech that inherently chills it.
The only requisite intent that should be necessary to consider as "speech" the
conduct of filming police is the intent to observe their actions, in accord with the
classic watchdog tradition of a free press.113 As Reggie Shuford, executive director
of the ACLU of Pennsylvania, explained in response to Judge Kearney's opinion:
Police have extraordinary power, and civilian recordings of police ac
tions are essential to holding police accountable for how they use that
power. The freedom to monitor the police without fearing arrest or
retaliation is one of the ways we distinguish a free society from a po
lice state.114

Attorney Mary Catherine Roper, the deputy legal director for the ACLU of
Pennsylvania who represents both Richard Fields and Amanda Geraci, added

https://photographyisnotacrime.com/2016/02/22/rookie-federal-judge-in-pennsylvania-rules
citizens-do-not-have-first-amendment-right-to-record-police [https://perma.cc/7M2T-PTSQJ.
112. Jordan Rushie, Apparently You Do Not Have a First Amendment Right to Photograph the Police in
Pennsylvania, PHILLY LAW BLOG (Feb. 22, 2016) https://phillylawblog.wordpress.com/
2016/02/22/apparently-you-do-not-have-a-first-amendment-right-to-photograph-the-police-in
pennsylvania-unless-you-do-a-little-jig [https://perma.cc/DSH2-JD24].
113. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes the role of the press "as a watchdog of government activity."
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,447 (1991). As the late C. Edwin Baker explained,"the press
receives constitutional protection to be a voice independent of the government (or, at least,
independent of the other three 'estates') in order to perform the crucial democratic tasks of
providing an independent source of vision and information,including performance of a watchdog
role." C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 968 (2007). More simply put by Professor Vincent Blasi, the value of a
free press is that it "serve[s] in checking the abuse of power by public officials." Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977).
Watchdog journalism involves "documenting the activities of government, business, and other
public institutions in ways that expose little-publicized or hidden activities to public scrutiny." W.
Lance Bennett & William Serrin, The Watchdog Role, in THE PRESS 169, 169 (Geneva Overholser
& Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2005).
114. ACLU-PA Issues Statement in Response to Copwatch Ruling, ACLU OF PA. (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.aclupa.org/news/2016/02/24/aclu-pa-issues-statement-response-copwatch-ruling
[https://perma.cc/FT2V-EX5E].
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that "in this day and age, frankly, the ability to record police is such an important
part of our move to ensure that our police are accountable."115
Roper's words are not empty rhetoric regarding the link between the ability
to record police and holding them accountable. In fact, it was a citizen-taken vid
eo of a white police officer Michael Slager shooting an unarmed African Ameri
can Walter Scott multiple times in the back in North Charleston, South
Carolina, in 2015 that now provides the critical evidence for holding Slager le
gally accountable for murder at his trial slated for October 2016.116 As Mark
Berman wrote in the Washington Post, the video of the Scott shooting taken by
barber Feidin Santana while walking to work demonstrates "the acute power of
video to establish evidence of police brutality, even when the officers say they
have done nothing wrong."117 In brief, attorney Roper's remarks in the aftermath
of Fields about the link between recording of police and holding them accounta
ble rings profoundly true.
The second and, perhaps, even more troubling aspect of the district court's
decision is that it embraces a viewpoint-based test. Specifically, Judge Kearney's
ruling "means that only photos and videos of police taken in the spirit of protest
or meant to express some other message of disapproval are protected."118 Con
versely, recordings made with the intent to laud or to praise the police seemingly
would not constitute speech. In other words, the specific viewpoint and intent
adopted by a person recording police appears to be outcome determinative of
First Amendment protection under the district court's analysis.
That is exceedingly disturbing because, as Professor Joseph Blocher
writes, "the prevention of viewpoint discrimination has long been considered
the central concern of the First Amendment."119 In particular, viewpoint-based
discrimination is a subcategory of content-based regulations,120 and it is almost

115. Daniel Craig, Pa. ACLU to Appeal Ruling Against First Amendment Right to Film Police, PHILLY
VOICE (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.phillyvoice.com/pa-aclu-appealing-ruling-against-first
amendment-right-film-police [https://perma.cdKV64-RVZ2].
116. See Alan Blinder & Timothy Williams, Ex-South Carolina Officer Is Indicted in Shooting Death of
Black Man, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/us/former-south
carolina-officer-is-indicted-in-death-of-walter-scott.html [https://perma.cdV5P5-95AH].
117. Mark Berman, Shooting in South Carolina Emphasizes Power of Video Footage, WASH. POST (Apr.
9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/shooting-in-south-carolina-emphasizes
power-of-video-footage/2015/04/09/47582818-dfD0-11e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html
[https://perma.cd6SG9-Z6EB].
118. Brentin Mock, The Right to Film Cops Comes Into Question, CITYLAB (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.citylab.com/crime/2016/02/there-is-no-first-amendment-right-to-film-cops/470670
[https://perma.cdCC8L-LPYH].
119. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 696 (2011).
120. See Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Difovored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado,
the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U. L.
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always unconstitutional as "an egregious form of content discrimination."121 As
the U.S. Supreme Court wrote twenty-one years ago, "[w]hen the government
targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant."122
Indeed, the Court has further observed that "[a]t the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our
political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal."123 Judge Kearney's analysis
in Fields, however, turns this principle on its head by mandating that citizens ex
press and adopt a specific sentiment-one criticizing or challenging police during
the act of recording-if they seek shelter under the blanket of First Amendment
protection.
In contrast to either viewpoint-based or content-based regulations,124 as
Professor John Fee writes, "content-neutral speech regulations are subject to a
more lenient First Amendment standard,"125 namely intermediate scrutiny. 126
Professor Seth Kreimer notes the importance of the content-neutrality doctrine
at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court, observing that:
The Roberts Court has adverted to content neutrality as a defining el
ement efFirst Amendment doctrine in no less than twenty-two of the
thirty-seven free expression cases it has decided on the merits over
the last eight years, and virtually all of the decisions of recognized
public consequence. Majority opinions regularly declaim that

REV. 179, 195 (2001) (calling viewpoint discrimination "a subset of content discrimination").
Content-based regulations typically are valid only if they survive strict scrutiny review, which
requires that a law "is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve
that interest." Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); see United States v.
Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting that a content-based speech restriction
"can stand only ifit satisfies strict scrutiny," and asserting that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based
on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest").
121. Rosenberger v. Rector ofthe Univ. ofVa.,515 U.S. 819,829 (1995).
122. Id.
123. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.622,641 (1994).
124. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) ("Government regulation of speech is
content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed.").
125. John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2005).
126. See Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable
Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. &POL'y 131, 131-32 (2008) (asserting that "the Court has devised tests to
review content-based and content-neutral regulations (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations,
a more lenient intermediate scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral)").
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"content-based" restrictions on speech are presumptively unconsti
tutional.127

Writing recently, Professor Corey Brettschneider explains that "[t]he doctrine of
viewpoint neutrality is central to First Amendment jurisprudence. It requires the
state to not treat speech differently based on a speaker's political or philosophical
opinions."128
The intent of Amanda Geraci was, as noted earlier, simply to observe police
action. 129 The intent to observe-an intent, in other words, to record while not
taking sides or adopting a particular viewpoint-fully embodies the principle of
content neutrality. It thus is quite ironic that the district court would deny
Geraci-a neutral observer-First Amendment protection because she chose not
to adopt an antigovernment viewpoint.
In summary, Judge Kearney's analysis requiring citizens to announce to the
police or to demonstrate through their expressive conduct that they intend to
challenge and criticize police action is not only impractical in operation, but also
conflicts with long-standing principles against viewpoint-based government reg
ulations. The district court should not mandate a citizen to adopt a particular
viewpoint in order to be protected by the First Amendment.
IV.

WHOSERIGHTISITANYWAY?DISTINGUISHINGBETWEEN
CITIZENS AND THE PRESS

In ruling against Richard Fields and Amanda Geraci, Judge Kearney point
ed out that "[t]hey are not members the press. Each engaged in activity they per
sonally described as non-confrontational 'observing' and 'recording."' 130 Perhaps
sub silentio in this observation lurks the notion that if Fields and Geraci had been
members of the press-if they had silently observed police as professional jour
nalists-then the outcome would have been different. Why else, in other words,
even raise or interject into the legal mix the fact of their non-press status if it was
not somehow relevant?
Importantly, Judge Kearney is not the only federal judge to acknowledge
different treatment of citizens and the press when it comes to the First

if

127. Seth F. Kreimer, GoodEnough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA.J.
CONST. L. 1261, 1265-66 (2014) (emphasis added).
128. Corey Brettschneider, Value Democracy as the Basis for Viewpoint Neutrality: A Theory ofFree Speech
andIts Implications for the State Speech andLimitedPublic Forum Doctrines, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 603,
605 (2013).
129. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
130. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2016).
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Amendment right to record police in public places. Judge P. Kevin Castel of the
Southern District of New York in 2015 in Higginbotham v. City New York131
concluded "that the right to record police activity in public, at least in the case a
journalist who is otherwise unconnected to the events recorded, was in fact 'clearly es
tablished' at the time of the events alleged in the complaint."132
Latent in Judge Kearney's analysis in Fields and in Judge Castel's decision in
Higginbotham suggesting the right to record cops is possessed by journalists, but
not by citizens generally, is the related distinction between the Speech Clause and
the Press Clause. The fork in the First Amendment road for those seeking to
record police, at least in the courtrooms of Judges Kearney and Castel, perhaps
goes something like this:
you are a non-journalist, then you go down the path the Speech Clause. On
this path, it is not sufficient merely to silently observe in order to gain First
Amendment protection. One must instead, as a threshold matter, demon
strate that one is actually engaging in "speech." This can be done either via
the spoken word (verbally criticizing or challenging police while simultane
ously recording them) or by some form of expressive conduct (akin to flag
burning) that satisfies the Spence test for symbolic speech. Only after one
clears this hurdle will First Amendment "speech" protection apply.

if

• lf

if

if

• lfyou are a member ifthe press, then your silent recording ifpolice garners Press
Clause protection as a facet if the unenumerated right to gather news. Getting
on this path may not be easy, however, because determining who is a mem
ber of the press or a professional journalist poses a vast problem with the di
chotomy suggested by Judges Kearney and Castel-and one for which they
offer no solutions. Additionally, as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky points out,
the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings over the years-despite dicta in cases like
Branzburg v. Hayes133-"without exception, have failed to provide any First
Amendment protection for newsgathering. Indeed, the Court has declared
that there is no exemption for the press from general laws."134 This path to
protection is neither a smooth nor well-worn path, but rather quite rocky.
Professor Sonja West concurs in a 2014 article, artfully writing:

131. 105 F. Supp. 3d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
132. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
133. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court wrote in Branzburg that "without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
134. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Aggressive
Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2000); see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663, 669 (1991) (describing a "well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news").
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If the Speech Clause is the Court's favorite child, the Press Clause
has been the neglected one. During the same period that the
Court has developed wide-ranging protections under the Speech
Clause, it has all but failed to notice the Press Clause's existence, and
when it has noticed, it has been with a mindset of skepticism and de
featism.135

Ultimately, a distinction based on status of the recorder-ordinary citizen
versus professional journalist-when it comes to the right to film police is fun
damentally flawed in ways far beyond the definitional difficulties. For example,
Professor William Lee of the University of Georgia cogently argues that "because
the value of expression does not depend upon the identity of its source, efforts to
separate the citizen journalists from the press are constitutionally flawed. Stated
differently, the constitutional value and protection of expression does not depend
upon whether it emanates from an institution recognized as the press."136 Indeed,
the value of the smartphone video-both to the criminal justice system and to the
public at large-taken by citizen Feidin Santana of officer Michael Slager shoot
ing Walter Scott in the back is as important as if it had been taken by a member
of the press.137
Similarly, Professor Erik Ugland has called on the U.S. Supreme Court to
"abandon any suggestion that 'freedom of the press' implies anything other than
the freedom all citizens to seek out the news and to communicate it through me
dia."138 Even more broadly, Ugland urged the Court to reject the notion that the
"the Speech and Press Clauses be read to provide distinct sets of rights based on
communicators' expertise, credentials, or institutional affiliations."139 Erasing the
Speech and Press Clause distinction would, in tum, do away with the fork-in
the-First-Amendment-road problem described immediately above in the
analyses of Judges Kearney and Castel. In summary, distinguishing between
citizens and members of the press when deciding who possesses a First
Amendment right to film police in public is unsound.

if

135. Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2439 (2014).
136. William E. Lee, Citizen-Critics, Citizen Journalists, and the Perils Defining the Press, 48 GA. L.

REV. 757,771 (2014).
137. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing this video).
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138. Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation
Amendment, 3 DUKEJ. CONST. L. &PuB. POL'y 113,189 (2008) (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 179.
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CONCLUSION

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has never recognized a
clearly established First Amendment right to film the police doing their jobs in
public venues.140 The ACLU of Pennsylvania now is appealing Fields,1 41 howev
er, which provides the Third Circuit with a prime opportunity to finally join the
First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits142 in embracing this constitutional
right.
In recognizing this right and in reversing the district court's ruling, the
Third Circuit should also make several key points clear in order to facilitate and
buttress the strength of the First Amendment right to record police. These
points entail specifying that:
1) The right belongs to all citizens, not just to members ofthe press or prefessional
journalists. Citizens armed with smartphones play a vital watchdog role today on
police, monitoring police activities and often when journalists are not present to
capture abuses of authority. The citizen-taken video of the shooting of Walter
Scott described above makes that clear. 143 Additionally, defining who constitutes
a member of a select press class, at least for purposes of the right to record, is ex
ceedingly difficult, further militating against drawing any citizen-versus-press di
chotomy.
2) There is no need for a citizen to hold a specific viewpoint about the police activi
ty he or she is recording in order for the act recording to constitute speech. The Third
Circuit should remove the district court's requirement that citizens are only pro
tected by the First Amendment if they record with the intent to challenge or to
criticize police activity. An intent to observe the police-for whatever reason or
purpose, and certainly not requiring an unconstitutional viewpoint-based rea
son like the one suggested by Judge Kearney-should be sufficient to trigger First
Amendment protection.
3) A citizen's silence when recording police does not adversely affect the determina
tion that the act recording images police is speech. To require a person to speak
up when simultaneously engaged in the act of image capture and creation simply
is unnecessary. A tattoo artist need not talk when she works to create a tattoo in

if

if

if

140. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
141. See ACLU-PA Issues Statement in Response to Copwatch Ruling, supra note 114 (quoting Reggie
Shuford, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Pennsylvania, for
the proposition that "Judge Kearney's ruling is an outlier, and we intend to appeal it'').
142. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (addressing these courts' recognition of qualified First
Amendment right to record police in public places).
143. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
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order for the act of tattooing to constitute speech. 144 Similarly, a citizen photog
rapher need not speak while taking a picture to obtain First Amendment protec
tion.
4) There is no need to engage in expressive conduct under Spence when recording
in order to trigger First Amendment protection. The Third Circuit here should
adopt the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that "[t]he act of making an audio or au
diovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment's guaran
tee of speech and press rights."145
5) A citizen does not need to explain to police ef.ficers why he or she is recording
their activity. People should not be forced to tell government officials why they
are engaging in the speech activity that is the recording of images. Just as the
U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a qualified First Amendment right to engage in
anonymous speech rather than being forced to reveal one's identity and thereby
risk either government or private reprisal,146 so too must there be a right not to be
compelled to reveal to police the reason why one is recording them and risk retali
ation or directly incur their wrath at the end of a baton stick.
In summary, the district court's ruling in Fields-that a person who is not a
member of the press, but who nonetheless is recording the police, must either
speak up or act up (expressive conduct) in a way that challenges and criticizes po
lice in order to obtain speech protection under the First Amendment-is flawed
for multiple reasons. This Article explored four such reasons. Now, the Third
Circuit should recognize the flawed logic of the lower court in Fields and reverse
the decision. In the process, the appellate court should embrace the five points
set forth immediately above.

144. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (addressing the tattooing-is-speech cases).
145. ACLU oflll. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583,595 (7th Cir 2012).
146. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,357 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional an
Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature,reasoning that
"[u]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice,but
an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the
majority.").

